Lusaka Agreement 1999

The importance of this meeting was to expand the list of presences to other actors in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, such as Kagame, who refused to sign the Sirte agreement until Rwanda`s security problems were resolved. The meeting also confirmed Libya`s intention to change Its Arab policy and become an important player in Great Lakes affairs. c. Angola – A ceasefire agreement in the Democratic Republic of Congo allows for the focus on UNITA`s activities in its own country of troops deployed in the northern sector of the DRC. The only confrontation was with Chadian forces sent last year to reinforce Kabila`s troops. After a few weeks, Chadians withdrew from the front due to unusual terrain and increasing causalities. Since then, Uganda has managed to occupy and control this northern sector. The capture of Gbadolit during the Lusaka negotiations was extremely important; both, symbolically, as the birthplace of the late President Mobutu, as a mass of political and strategic negotiation because of its airfield and its military support base. The tactics show the power of the Ugandan army and the broader strategic framework that is being put in place.

With Gbadolite in hand, Uganda can confidently authorize the continuation of inter-Belgian negotiations, as the agreement provides that the respective rebel groups and their allies retain control of the territories currently occupied until a new political exception regime is established in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This will allow Uganda to continue its campaign to neutralize rebel groups formed by Sudan. It will also send a message to neighbouring countries that Uganda has a military force that could have gone as far as Kinshasa. Given that the JMC is made up of representatives of the belligerents and has no responsibility or oversight mechanism by a neutral body, the ICG recommends that the OAU play a more active role as an arbiter of the agreement and play that role until the UN PK force is able to provide accountability and oversight. , as stipulated in the agreement. The investigation by the South African Foreign Minister and zambian Minister of State into the demands of RCD leaders is still ongoing. They will decide whether Wamba should sign the agreement and under what conditions. However, it is very clear that a leadership conflict within the movement cannot justify its refusal to sign or its decision to continue to fight.

The harsh reality is that negotiations on the signing of the ceasefire agreement have been dominated by wishful thinking. Negotiators assumed the following assumptions; After a year of failed attempts by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), South Africa and other regional power agents, the six countries involved in the war of the seven African nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo signed the ceasefire agreement in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka. The war has instilled in Kabila and his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, against a Congolese insurgency supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi since August 1998. Among the main provisions of the agreement are the immediate cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the warring parties, to investigate ceasefire violations, to develop mechanisms for disarming the identified militias and to monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to a set timetable; The deployment of a united Nations Chapter 7 force to disarm armed groups, round up civilians and provide humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons and refugees; and the establishment of a Congolese national dialogue that would lead to a “new political liberation in the Democratic Republic of Congo”.